We prove the existence of a Circular Competitive Equilibrium (CCE), in a model of competitive equilibrium with restricted participation. The direction of trade is determined by the quotients of players' beliefs in consecutive states and the marginal rates of substitution calculated at initial endowments. We calculate wealth and belief e¤ects and provide su¢ cient conditions under which the CCE is unique. We prove that any CCE has the relevant e¢ ciency property.
Introduction
Competitive equilibrium with restricted participation is a natural framework for studing many economic phenomena. There are several reasons why participation is restricted in some markets. First, transaction costs may be prohibitively high if traders are geographically distant from each other or subject to signi…cant taxes. Second, legal barriers associated with trade and contracts may restrict the set of agents with whom one can sign a contract. Third, the informational structure of markets may restrict participation.
For instance, traders may be strongly averse to ambiguity, preferring to specialize in a couple of markets.
We study competitive equilibrium when agent participation is restricted in a special way; namely, circular trade. In this case, exchanges occur between pairs of agents and each trader performs transactions only with two other individuals, so that all possible transactions have a circular con…guration (see Figure 1 ). First, we de…ne and prove the existence of a Circular Competitive Equilibrium (CCE). Then, we show that the product of quotients of beliefs and the product of marginal rates of substitution, evaluated at initial endowments, determine the direction of trade. The remarkable aspect of this characterization is that it is not necessary to …nd a CCE to compute the direction of trade. We propose measures of individual trade volume and indicate how to aggregate them to de…ne a measure of market trade volume. We also investigate wealth and belief e¤ects; that is, trader's excess demands change when her initial endowment or beliefs marginally change. We present su¢ cient conditions under which the CCE is unique and describe the relevant e¢ ciency property for CCEs, which we name 'constrained e¢ ciency'.
Finally, we prove that all CCE are constrained e¢ cient.
Why is it important to analyze the case where participation is restricted to a circular trade pattern? There are at least three reasons. First, Rodrigues-Neto [13] shows that for a given set of posteriors to be consistent with a common prior, it is necessary and su¢ cient that certain cycle equations hold. These equations are the counterpart of our equilibrium condition, which relates beliefs and marginal rates of substitution. Inconsistency in players' beliefs, which is re ‡ected by a violated cycle equation, generates reasons for trade if all players are risk neutral. However, when players are risk averse, inconsistent beliefs is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for trade to exist. Consumers'initial endowments and preferences also have an impact on the equilibrium outcome. We provide a single equation that aggregates the e¤ects of all of these elements, beliefs, initial endowments, and preferences, to …nd the direction and volume of trade.
Second, we establish two di¤erent sets of su¢ cient conditions under which a positive individual wealth shock is transmitted to all other players along the circular structure.
One set compares players'coe¢ cients of relative and absolute risk aversion. The other set establishes bounds on the product of quotients of players'beliefs, divided by the product of their marginal rates of substitution prior to trade. This result is particularly interesting because it relies on a condition for the whole group of players, instead of focusing exclusively on the characteristics of one trader. Moreover, the techniques used to …nd wealth e¤ects are extended to calculate belief e¤ects. Given that we are able to generate detailed results with comparative statics, circular trade may work as a benchmark case.
Circular trade is a very simple structure in which the actions of each player clearly impact everybody else. From this basic case, we may be able to launch investigations into competitive equilibrium with restricted participation in much more complex structures.
The third reason for studying the circular trade is that in many cases the knowledge structure is consistent with the circular trade, even if this is not so obvious at …rst glance. By appropriately merging contingencies, we may obtain a set of states of the world compatible with circular trade. Section 4 exempli…es this situation.
The structure of circular trade resembles Hotelling's [6] set up as well as later works, by Salop [14] and Irmen and Thisse [7] ; however, there are important di¤erences. The latter models analyze competition in a partial equilibrium context where competition based on product di¤erentiation determines a player's location. In our model, location can be exogenously determined by the knowledge structure, while trade is analyzed according to a general equilibrium framework.
The study of circular trade brings together discussions about restrictions on trade and subjective beliefs. Balasko et al.'s [2] work is related to restrictions on trade. They extend the model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to the model of restricted participation. In this framework, traders may have access to di¤erent markets.
Since restrictions vary across individuals, incomplete markets can be understood as a special case in which trade restrictions are the same for all. Balasko et al. show that this generalization presents real indeterminacy similar to the incomplete markets case, with assumptions about the number of traders. Polemarchakis and Siconol… [12] prove generic existence of competitive equilibria when there is restricted market participation with assets that pay in commodity bundles. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [4] prove existence and local uniqueness when markets are incomplete and payo¤s are determined in terms of a numeraire commodity. Kawamura [8] studies competitive equilibrium in production economies with unawareness.
Aumann [1] introduces the partitional approach to study knowledge and common knowledge. He shows that, if players have a common prior, they cannot agree to disagree; that is, it cannot be common knowledge that they have di¤erent posterior probabilities over a given event. Samet [15] and Samet [16] give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a set of posterior beliefs to be consistent with a common prior. Rodrigues-Neto [13] introduces the concept of cycles, providing alternative conditions to check for consistency of posterior beliefs.
Milgrom and Stokey [10] consider no-trade theorems and argue that there is no reason for trade when prices are fully revealing. Geanakoplos [5] surveys economic problems and puzzles related to common knowledge. Morris [11] analyzes how di¤erent economic environments concerning common knowledge, incentive compatibility, and rational expectations assumptions determine the type of priors heterogeneity that makes trade possible. 1 Finally, Dow and Gorton [3] present a general equilibrium model where agents are restricted to buying the market portfolio. In this sense, their model is a reduced form of pro…table informed trading models, since the source of trade restrictions is exogenous.
Researchers have only recently begun to understand that disagreements (and consequently trade) arise from unbalanced cycles; hence, no research has been done on the 1 See more references of no-trade theorems in Morris [11] .
speci…c case of circular trade. The next section introduces the competitive equilibrium model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis and Section 4 provides an example of circular trade. Section 5 presents some comparative statics results. Section 6 establishes results on e¢ ciency and presents conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. The
Appendix contains all proofs.
Circular Competitive Equilibrium

Setup
Consider a model of general equilibrium with a single consumption good and k 3 individuals, indexed by j 2 J = f1; ; kg. There are two periods: at time t = 0, there is uncertainty about which state of the world will be realized at time t = 1. There is no consumption at t = 0. Each player j 2 J meets at period t = 0 with players j 1 and (j + 1)(mod k) in order to trade the so-called simple claims. By de…nition, a simple claim is an asset that pays one unit of consumption at t = 1 when the true state is some particular ! 2 . The number of states is equal to the number of players. Hence, the state space is de…ned by = f1; ; kg, and its typical element is denoted by !. At t = 0, the price of a simple claim paying at state ! is denoted by q ! . Let z j ! represent j's net purchase of this security and let x j ! and e j ! represent, respectively, the consumption and the initial endowment of j when state ! is realized. Hence, x j ! = e j ! + z j ! , for all ! and all j. A typical element of j's consumption bundle is denoted by
of consumption bundles of all players, and X be the Cartesian product of all individuals consumption sets:
, , e j k ) denote, respectively, j's net purchase of assets and initial endowment. Let z = (z 1 , , z k ) and e = (e 1 , , e k ) be, respectively, the pro…le of net purchases and the pro…le of initial endowments of all players.
Players have subjective beliefs about the realization of each state of the world. Because their beliefs di¤er, player's conditional expectations about the future and, consequently, their expected utilities, depend on their particular beliefs. Let j ! denote player j's belief that the true state is !. Individual j's preferences are represented by the utility function u j (x j ! ). According to her beliefs, j's expected utility at t = 0, is:
Assumption 1: Securities
i. There is no redundancy in the …nancial market: each asset pays one unit of the consumption good at t = 1 if the true state is ! and zero otherwise.
ii. The number of available securities is the same as the number of states of the world.
Assumption 2: Beliefs
For all players j 2 J, beliefs satisfy 
Assumption 3: Preferences
The preferences of each player j 2 J are represented by utility functions u j : R + ! R satisfying:
i. di¤erentiability, monotonicity, and concavity: u j is of class C 3 (three times continuously di¤erentiable); its …rst derivative, denoted u j 1 , is always positive, u j 1 (x j ! ) > 0, and its second derivative, denoted u j 11 , is always negative, u
As a consequence of part iii, the derivative of A j is always non-positive, A j 1 (x) 0, 8x 2 X j . Also, the third derivative of j's utility function, denoted u j 111 (x), is always positive.
Assumption 4: Initial endowments
For every agent j, initial endowments are strictly positive: e j ! > 0.
Assumption 5: Consumption sets
The consumption set of each agent j, namely
Assumption 6: Restricted participation
Players'participation in …nancial markets is restricted. Each individual j trades only two assets, each one with di¤erent traders. To simplify notation, let agent j have access to markets j and j + 1. The last consumer, j = k, trades assets k and 1.
Assumption 7: Rationality and information
Players are rational and have common knowledge of all parameters in the model, except for the true state.
De…nition 1. (Circular Trade)
A circular trade is a set of at least two exchanges of elementary securities, ordered in a way that each trader j 2 J has access only to two markets, j and (j + 1)(mod k), and satis…es the market clearing condition at t = 0, namely z 
Utility Maximization
The lack of access to markets other than j and j + 1 leaves player j with no other choice than consuming exactly her initial endowment e j ! , at all states ! = 2 fj; j + 1g. Since there is only one good, its price is normalized to 1 at all states. Considering prices of securities as given, namely q = (q 1 ; ; q k ) 2 R k ++ , agent j solves the following problem at t = 0: max
subject to: given by:
This condition tells us that the prices ratio q j+1 =q j must be equal to the ratio of j's beliefs about states ! = j + 1 and ! = j, multiplied by the marginal rates of substitution in the same states.
Player j's problem has a solution because the objective function is continuous and its arguments are restricted to a compact subset of the Euclidean space. Moreover, the solution is unique because, by Assumption 3, the utility functions are strictly quasiconcave. A Circular Competitive Equilibrium (CCE) is a set of prices for all assets q, a circular trade z determined by every player j's solution of (2.1) under prices q, and allocation x such that x = e + z. A CCE is represented by (q; z; x).
Observe that CCE requires clearing markets and maximizing behavior from all players subject to their respective budget constraints. The de…nition of CCE is similar to the traditional concept of competitive equilibrium, with an additional restriction on trade possibilities. From now on, to simplify the discussion, we normalize prices so that q k = 1.
De…nition 3. (Local Uniqueness)
A normalized equilibrium price vector q = (q 1 ; ; q j ; ; q k 1 ; 1) 2 R k ++ is locally unique if there is a value > 0 such that, for any other normalized price vector b q whose Euclidean distance from q is smaller than , the pro…le of net purchasesẑ such thatẑ j is player j's solution of (2.1) under prices b q, does not constitute a circular trade.
Consider the product of all players'beliefs ratios
. Formally, let be de…ned as:
If there is no disagreement on relevant beliefs, In the case of risk averse agents, we generalize this result by providing a condition that relates di¤erences in beliefs, tastes, and initial endowments. To present this condition, let e U (x) denote the product of marginal rates of substitution for all players, u
In particular, let e U (e) be the value of e U (x) at x = e. Proposition 1 proves that a CCE always exists, is locally unique and that, in equilibrium, the product of marginal rates of substitution, e U (x), must coincide with the product of all players' beliefs ratios, .
Hence, there is no trade if and only if = e U (e).
Proposition 1. (Existence of Circular Competitive Equilibrium)
Suppose that Assumptions 1 through 7 are satis…ed. Then:
(i) There is a CCE (q; z; x). For almost every vector of initial endowments, the CCE's normalized price vector q = (q 1 ; ; q j ; ; q k 1 ; 1) 2 R k ++ is locally unique.
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(ii) In this CCE, the following condition is satis…ed:
(iii) Conversely, if there is a circular trade z such that the allocation x = e + z satis…es (2.3), then there is a price vector q 2 R k ++ such that (q; z; x) is a CCE. The price vector q is unique up to multiplication by positive constants; that is, the collection of all relative prices q j+1 =q j is unique. 
Individual and Market Trade Volume
We introduce measures of individual trade volumes and market trade volume. We de…ne only equilibrium volumes, but it is straightforward to extend this de…nition to any pro…le of allocations.
De…nition 4. (Trade Volumes)
The individual trade volume of each player j, in a CCE with allocation x, is de…ned as:
The market trade volume, denoted , is de…ned as:
The constant 1 in the expressions above is added to make j a continuous function of z 4 Add one to both sides of (3.1) and then apply ln( ). Using the …rst-order Taylor approximation ln(1 + ) = , which is more accurate the closer is to zero, we …nd that = X j2J j . In words, the market trade volume is approximately equal to the sum of individual trade volumes when all of these volumes are su¢ ciently small.
(ii) The market trade volume is an upper bound for the trade volume of every player.
Formally, j < , 8j 2 J.
An Example of Circular Trade
There are three players: Ann (A), Bob (B), and Carl (C). The information structure is common knowledge, with the state space de…ned as = f1, 2, 3g. Let P j denote player j's partition, where j = A; B; C. More speci…cally, P A = ff1; 2g, f3gg, P B = ff2; 3g, f1gg, and P C = ff1; 3g, f2gg. Ann negotiates only the claims that pay if the true state is 1 or 2 because she knows when 3 is realized, and other players know that she knows this.
With no transaction costs, Ann trades the securities paying in states 1 and 2 even when the true state is 3. Since she is indi¤erent between trading or not trading assets paying in states 1 or 2 when 3 occurs, we assume that whoever buys the claim that pays in 3 agrees to pay her some in…nitesimally small fee for participating in the market if the true state turns out to be 3. Similarly, Bob trades only simple claims that pay if the realized states are 2 or 3, while Carl is limited to claims paying at 1 or 3.
The following …gure illustrates a circular trade involving Ann, Bob, and Carl. The numbers over the arrows represent states of the world. The arrows point to the direction of the delivery of the commodity. For example, Bob has a contract in which he delivers some amount of the consumption good to Carl when state 3 is realized.
Ann
Carl Bob 
All players know that in the next period they will receive one unit of the single good, independently of which state is realized; that is, e j ! = 1, 8j 2 J, 8! 2 S. Equilibrium conditions are:
As a result, Ann buys z A 1 = 1=5 units of the asset that pays in state 1, Bob buys z B 2 = 1=7 units of the claim paying in state 2, and Carl purchases z C 3 = 1=3 units of the asset paying in state 3. As for prices, after normalizing q 1 = 1, we …nd that q 2 = 7=5 and q 3 = 3=5.
The equilibrium allocation is
We can analytically solve the CCE here, but this is not generally the case. Yet we can always …nd the direction of trade by comparing the product of marginal rates of substitution at the initial endowments with the product of belief ratios:
As a consequence of Proposition 2, all z j j > 0. In equilibrium, marginal rates of substitution are:
The market trade volume is = 3, and individual trade volumes are: private information about stock X. Hence, Ann's knowledge partition is: P 0 A = ffs 1 , s 2 g, fs 3 g, fs 4 , s 5 g, fs 6 gg. Bob cannot tell about stock Y . His partition is de…ned as: 2 , s 3 g, fs 4 g, fs 5 , s 6 gg. Finally, Carl has no information about stock Z, and then, P 0 C = ffs 1 ; s 6 g, fs 2 g, fs 3 , s 4 g, fs 5 gg. Consider the following state space: state 1 is equal to the set of contingencies fs 1 ; s 4 g; that is, 1 = fs 1 ; s 4 g, state 2 = fs 2 ; s 5 g and 3 = fs 3 ; s 6 g. Let = f1; 2; 3g. Players' partitions (over ) are P A = ff1; 2g, f3gg, P B = ff2; 3g, f1gg, and P C = ff1; 3g, f2gg. This transforms a more complex example into the framework of the Circular Trade Model.
Comparative Statics
To …nd a CCE, the following system must have a solution
This system can be rewritten as a system of k variables z j j and k equations F j (z) = 0, with j 2 J, where:
; kg .
Let B be the Jacobian matrix of F = (F 1 ; ; F k ) with respect to z; that is, B = D z F . To calculate B, note that each F j (z) depends on z 
, where b j = @F j =@z j j and c j = @F j =@z j+1 j+1 . Taking these derivatives:
Wealth E¤ects
The wealth e¤ect for agent j is the vector of partial derivatives of her demand for asset j with respect to initial endowments of every player j 2 J, evaluated at a CCE. Hence, there are k vectors of wealth e¤ects, one for each player j. Wealth e¤ects are formally de…ned as the matrix D e z that describes the rate of change of the equilibrium trade z when e j j or e j j+1 of each player j marginally increases. 5 If we want to emphasize dependence on endowments or on beliefs, we write, respectively, F j (z; e) or F j (z; ) instead of F j (z), where = ( 1 ; ; k ) and, 8j 2 J, j = (
From the implicit function theorem, whenever the determinant of B, denoted jBj, is di¤erent from zero, the …rst-order e¤ects of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables can be locally calculated at the points satisfying the k equations F j (z; e) = 0,
depends 
Belief E¤ects
It is possible to analyze the e¤ects on trade of variations in player beliefs, applying a similar technique to the one used to calculate wealth e¤ects. 
(ii) Assume that z j j < 0. For each player j 2 J:
In the example of Section 4, all utilities satisfy R , then c j < 0. (i) Suppose that all z j j > 0 and that the product of beliefs ratio is su¢ ciently small in the sense that < 2 e U (e). Then, all b j > 0.
(ii) Suppose that all z j j < 0 and the product of beliefs ratio is su¢ ciently large; that is, > e U (e)=2. Then, all c j < 0.
E¢ ciency and Uniqueness of the CCE
The CCE is not unique in general. However, if over all CCE, all coe¢ cients b j > 0 and all coe¢ cients c j < 0, then there is only one CCE. Although this result establishes conditions on endogenous variables, we can use Propositions 6, 7 or 9 to present su¢ cient conditions that are based on exogenous parameters.
Proposition 10. (Uniqueness of the CCE)
If, at every CCE allocation, all b j > 0 and all c j < 0, then there is only one CCE.
Since players have restricted access to markets, Pareto optimality is not a rule. For this reason, we compare the CCE allocation only to allocations in which transfers are restricted to existing assets.
De…nition 5. (Constrained E¢ cient Allocation)
Let j ! be a transfer made to player j when the realized state of the world is !, and j = ( 
such that:
with strict inequality holding at least once.
Proposition 11. (Constrained E¢ ciency)
Every Circular Competitive Equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient.
A Appendix -Proofs Proof of Proposition 1 (Existence of Circular Competitive Equilibrium)
Part (i). For this part of the proof, we …rst show the existence of the equilibrium by applying Kakutani's …xed point theorem, as in Mas-Colell et al. [9] . Player 1's excess demand function f 1 (q 1 ; q 2 ; e 1 ) :
++ is de…ned as follows: for each coordinate j = 2 f1; 2g, f 2 ) , such that:
0.
) A similar de…nition applies to players j 6 = 1. De…ne the aggregate excess demand function as:
Let h be a k dimensional vector, where each dimension represents the excess demand of one claim. That is, each h j denotes the j th component of this vector. We will prove that the aggregate excess demand function satis…es the following properties: (i) continuity,
(ii) homogeneity of degree zero, (iii) Walras'law: q h = 0, 8q 2 R k ++ , (iv) boundedness from below, (v) boundary condition: if lim n!1 q n = q, for some q 6 = 0 having at least one coordinate q j = 0, then lim n!1 maxfh 1; h 2; :::; h k g = 1. Given these …ve properties, the proof of existence follows the steps in Mas-Colell et al. [9] . 
There are three equations in (A.2), and also three endogenous variables, namely, z 1 1 , z 1 2 , and . Take the derivatives of all functions on the left-hand side of (A.2) with respect to the endogenous variables in the order as listed above. The Jacobian matrix, denoted A 1 , is given by:
The determinant of matrix A 1 is jA 1 j = (q 1 ) 
where I is a k 2 dimensional identity matrix and 0 are matrices of zeros. Since jAj = jA 1 j : jIj, matrix A has full rank and, by the implicit function theorem, player 1's excess demand is continuous. The same argument can be used for all other consumers, so that all demand functions are continuous. We conclude that the aggregate excess demand function, de…ned as the sum of individuals'excess demand functions, is continuous.
Homogeneity of degree zero comes from the fact that the maximization problem is not a¤ected when all prices q are multiplied by a positive constant. Walras'law is a direct consequence of part of Assumption 3, the monotonicity of utility functions, because all consumers will use all their resources, making their budget constraints hold with equality.
Boundedness from below is guaranteed by the budget constraints and the restriction of the consumption sets to the positive orthant.
For the boundary condition, consider, without loss of generality, two assets that pay in consecutive states j and j+1 such that q j > 0 and q j+1 = 0. Let q n 2 R k ++ j n = 1; 2; be a sequence converging to q. Let z j;n ! be j's net purchase of security paying at ! when prices are q n . Then, for each n, player j's …rst-order condition is:
As n goes to in…nity, q n j+1 goes to zero, and since u This completes this part of the argument. 6 Now we will show that the equilibrium is locally unique. We make use of the transversality theorem as stated in Mas-Colell et al. [9] . We have shown the existence of class C 1 demand functions for consumer j, namely, z j j (q j ; q j+1 ; e j ), z j j+1 (q j ; q j+1 ; e j ). For each asset j we can compute the aggregate excess demand, de…ned as z j = z
. Consider 6 Even if players were allowed to consume negative amounts and their utility functions did not satisfy the boundary condition 3.ii, aggregate excess demand would go to in…nity. Since q j+1 = 0 and z j;n j+1 ! +1 we would like to obtain h n j+1 ! 1. Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case. Then, z j+1;n j+1 ! 1, which implies that q j+2 = 0 and z j+1;n j+2 ! +1 or q j+2 > 0 and z j+1;n j+2 ! 0. We can continue recursively until we arrive at q j = 0 in the …rst case, or at z j;n j+1 ! 0 in the second case. There is a contradiction in both results which proves that h n j+1 ! +1. Therefore, there is always a market in which aggregate excess demand diverges to in…nity, say, maxfh 1 ; h 2 ; :::; h k g ! +1.
the vectors of k 1 aggregate excess demand functions:
. . .
Because we can normalize one asset price, for the application of the transversality theorem it su¢ ces to show that the rank of the matrix D e b Z is k 1, where: :::
Initial endowments that a¤ect the aggregate excess demand z j are: e 
Take the …rst k 1 columns. They form a k 1 square matrix whose determinant is the product of its diagonal elements. The same applies to the last k 1 columns.
It su¢ ces to show that for every player j, @z 
Part (ii).
Multiplying the …rst-order conditions (2.2) of all players, after cancelling prices and rearranging, we obtain = e U (x). Hence, (2.3) is a necessary condition for a CCE.
Part (iii). Conversely, given the initial endowments e and the circular trade z, we de…ne x = e + z. For each player j 2 J, de…ne the relative prices q j+1 =q j as:
.
Prices are unique up to the multiplication of a positive constant. 
Applying condition (2.3), e U (e) < e U (x) = . The same exercise is valid when all z j j < 0, with the symmetric result of e U (e) > . Finally, if all z j j = 0, equilibrium condition (2.3) requires that e U (e) = .
Now, suppose that e U (e) > . Thus, condition (2.3) implies that e U (x) < e U (e). There is at least one player j such that u
U (e) < and for e U (e) = . This concludes this proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Bounds on Individual Trade Volume)
Part (i). Note that:
Using equation (2.3) we obtain (3.2). This proves part (i).
Part (ii). First, assume that all z j j > 0. Since all j > 0, then for any j 2 J:
Thus, j < = = e U (e) 1. Next, assume that all z j j < 0. Since all j > 0, then for any j 2 J, (A.4) holds. Hence, j < = e U (e)= 1. This proves part (ii) and concludes this proof.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Sign of the Determinant of B)
A direct calculation shows that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of B is:
Using …rst the de…nitions of b j and c j , and later the equilibrium condition (2.3), we conclude that jBj is negative if and only if:
Note that if for all players j 2 J, z
In this case, inequality (A.5) must be satis…ed, making jBj negative.
Similarly, when all z j j < 0, the numerator
is greater than one and
) is smaller than one, implying a positive sign for jBj :
The determinant is zero if and only if Q
or, equivalently, if and only if z j j = 0. Wealth e¤ects cannot be calculated when there is no trade because we cannot apply the implicit function theorem. This concludes the proof of this Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Wealth E¤ects)
Part (i). Remember the expression of F j :
The matrix that de…nes the Jacobian of F = (F 1 , ..., F k ) with respect to initial endowments e j j has zero o¤-diagonal elements, while the typical entry of row j and column j, denoted h j , is h j = @F j =@e
1 H. Thus:
::: ::: . . .
:::
::: ::: ::: From Lemma 1, sign(jBj) = sign(z 
Part (ii).
Let e H = D e e F , where e e = (e 
Suppose that i 6 = j. Consider the derivative:
(A.6)
Clearly, the denominator is positive, since u 
We conclude that j is decreasing in e of each F j , we obtain:
Consider the matrix: 
Hence, we can verify that 8i; j 2 J, dz 
The derivative of j with respect to Similarly, the derivative of j with respect to i i+1 is:
Proposition 5 states that dz , we need to verify the sign of the expression:
The whole expression in brackets is positive, so that d j =d 
Using the assumption that u 
From the de…nition of absolute and relative risk aversion, respectively A j (x) and R j (x), the previous condition can be restated as:
Part (ii). Now, suppose that z j j < 0. Then:
Thus:
Using the equality z j j+1 = x j j+1 e j j+1 and following the steps of Part (i), we get:
concluding this proof. 1 < e U (e) 1 < 2 e U (e) e U (e) 1 = 1.
The last inequality comes from the hypothesis ; kg . Now we will show that q j j j q j+1 j j+1 for every player j 6 = 2. Assume by contradiction that q j z j j + q j j j + q j+1 z j j+1 + q j+1 j j+1 < 0. Then consumer j could increase her consumption of at least one good. By monotonicity, there is an a¤ordable bundle e x j satisfying
, meaning that consumer j would never choose x j . We conclude that: 
